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BITTORRENT COPYRIGHT TROLLING:  
A PRAGMATIC PROPOSAL FOR A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM 
Gregory S. Mortenson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION1 
When Adrienne Neal received a letter in the mail from the U.S. 
Copyright Group, she chose not to respond because she thought it 
was a scam.2  The letter contained a settlement offer, informing Ms. 
Neal that she was being sued in federal court for allegedly illegally 
downloading the copyrighted film Far Cry.3  The letter notified her 
that the plaintiff was willing to settle the matter out of court for a few 
thousand dollars.4  Having never heard of the film in question and 
confident in her innocence, Ms. Neal ignored the settlement offer 
and did not respond to the complaint—particularly because she did 
not fully understand the ins-and-outs of the proceedings and could 
not afford to hire an attorney to fight the charges.5  In response to 
her silence, the U.S. Copyright Group sought a default judgment for 
full damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.6  Stories such as these are 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S.B.A, 2006, 
Georgetown University.  Thanks to my family and friends for their love and support. 
 1  It is worth noting at the outset that when I began writing this Comment in 
August 2010 the topic was, at best, under-analyzed.  Since then, a good deal of 
scholarship on the issue has emerged, which I have tried to incorporate as fluidly as 
possible without altering the essence of my writing.  I am grateful that so many 
talented thinkers have turned their attention to the topic; I hope this Comment 
helps push the discussion forward. 
 2  Letter from Adrienne Neal at 3, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH 
& Co KG v. Adrienne Neal and Does 1–139, No. 1:10-cv-00453-RMC (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 
2011), ECF No. 162. 
 3  Id.  The plaintiff initially tried joining 4,577 anonymous “John Doe” 
defendants in the lawsuit.  See Amended Complaint at 1, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino 
Beteiligungs GMBH & Co KG v. Adrienne Neal and Does 1–4,577, No. 1:10-cv-00453-
RMC (D.D.C. May 12, 2010), ECF No. 12. 
 4  Letter from Adrienne Neal, supra note 2, at 3.  The exact amount of money 
requested from Ms. Neal was undisclosed but in another case the plaintiff sought 
$3,400 to settle.  See Ex. A to Complaint at 2, Seth Abrams v. Hard Drive Productions, 
Inc., and Does 1–50, No. 3:12-cv-01006 JCS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012), ECF No. 1 
[hereinafter Offer Letter]. 
 5  Letter from Adrienne Neal, supra note 2, at 3. 
 6  Affidavit in Support of Default at 1, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs 
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becoming more common as BitTorrent7 copyright litigation 
flourishes across the country. 
Copyright law is derived from Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, which gives Congress the power: “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”8  The law of copyright is designed as an incentive 
for the development of creative works.9  The United States Copyright 
Act10 outlines the types of works that are eligible for copyright 
protection11 and enumerates the potential remedies12 for copyright 
holders if their exclusive rights13 are violated.14  The Act explicitly 
states that copyright infringers can be held liable for either: (1) the 
copyright holder’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits, or (2) 
if actual damages are difficult to calculate, statutory damages ranging 
from $750 to $30,000 per infringement.15  If a copyright holder 
requests statutory damages, the court can increase the maximum 
award to $150,000 if the court finds that “infringement was 
committed willfully.”16 
The advent of the Internet and peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing 
has drastically changed the scope and nature of copyright 
considerations.17  Digital piracy of copyrighted works has had a 
 
GMBH & Co KG v. Adrienne Neal and Does 1–139, No. 1:10-cv-00453-RMC (D.D.C. 
Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 157; see also Second Amended Complaint for Copyright 
Infringement at 7, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs GMBH & Co KG v. 
Adrienne Neal and Does 1–139, No. 1:10-cv-00453-RMC (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2010), ECF 
No. 145. 
 7  BitTorrent is a specific type of file-sharing technology which will be explained 
in depth infra Part III.A.2. 
 8  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 9  Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1569, 1577 (2009) (“Copyright law is thus thought to exist primarily to give 
authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter disseminate their 
works publicly.”). 
 10  17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006). 
 11  Id. § 102. 
 12  Id. §§ 501–513. 
 13  Id. § 106. 
 14  The Supreme Court has clarified that in order to “establish [copyright] 
infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and 
(2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”  Feist Pub., Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 15  17 U.S.C. § 504. 
 16  Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 17  See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm 
Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543 (2007) (“The widespread use of peer-to-peer (P2P) 
file-sharing technology . . . has enabled ordinary Americans to become mass 
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profound effect on the media industry worldwide.18  Although new 
business models, like that of Hulu, are emerging to help monetize 
digital content, piracy is still attractive to some Internet users.19  
Industries such as film,20 video games,21 computer software,22 and 
music23 have all felt the effects of piracy.  As these industries have 
 
copyright infringers with spectacular ease.”).  To be clear, a P2P network is any 
network that “allow[s] users to share large files directly with one another without 
going through a central server.”  Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010).  Both Napster and BitTorrent are examples of P2P. 
 18  Illegal Downloading and Media Investment: Spotting the Pirates, ECONOMIST, Aug. 
20, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21526299 (discussing how 
consumer attitudes towards piracy around the world have a direct effect on the 
amount of money invested by companies in creating media). 
 19  See, e.g., Devin Coldewey, Delay On Hulu Availability More Than Doubles Piracy of 
Fox Shows, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 22, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/08/22/delay 
-on-hulu-availability-more-than-doubles-piracy-of-fox-shows/ (eight-day delay in 
original air-date and Hulu availability can encourage some fans to obtain the shows 
illegally—especially with newfound sense of “getting something for nothing” 
entitlement that consumers have in the digital age); see also Chris Welch, ‘Game of 
Thrones’ Season Premiere Illegally Downloaded Over One Million Times, THE VERGE (Apr. 1, 
2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/1/4171792/game-of-thrones-season-three-
premiere-pirated-one-million-times (noting that one million illegal downloads 
occurred less than twenty-four hours after the premiere, even though HBO “allowed 
customers to stream Game of Thrones via HBO Go at the same time that cable 
subscribers watched it live”). 
 20  In 2011, the most-pirated film, Fast Five, was illegally downloaded via 
BitTorrent over 9,000,000 times, which astoundingly was a decrease from 2010’s 
most-pirated film, Avatar— illegally downloaded 16,000,000 times.  Drew Olanoff, 
The Most Pirated Movie in 2011 was Downloaded 9,260,000 Times, THE NEXT WEB (Dec. 
24, 2011), http://thenextweb.com/media/2011/12/24/the-most-pirated-movie-in-
2011-was-downloaded-9260000-times/. 
 21  It is estimated that three-quarters of the video games released in late 2010 and 
early 2011 were shared illegally.  Editorial, Going After the Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/opinion/sunday/going-
after-the-pirates.html. 
 22  One study claimed that in 2009 over forty percent of software programs 
installed on computers around the world were obtained illegally.  BUSINESS SOFTWARE 
ALLIANCE, PIRACY IMPACT STUDY: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF REDUCING SOFTWARE 
PIRACY (Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://portal.bsa.org/piracyimpact2010/index 
.html. 
 23  Total revenue from U.S. music sales and licensing was $14.6 billion in 1999; 
the 2009 figure was only $6.3 billion.  David Goldman, Music’s Lost Decade: Sales Cut in 
Half, CNNMONEY (Feb. 3, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/compa 
nies/napster_music_industry/.  The International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI), a recording industry trade group, claims that in 2008 ninety-five 
percent of all music downloaded online was obtained illegally.  Legal Downloads 
Swamped by Piracy, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technolog 
y/7832396.stm.  The IFPI alleges that digital piracy accounted for thirty percent of 
the decline in global music sales from 2004 to 2009, Eric Pfanner, Music Industry 
Counts the Cost of Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/business/global/22music.html, but not 
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learned, effectively enforcing copyright in the digital age is difficult if 
not futile.24 
The 1999 release of Napster, a file-sharing application geared 
towards digital music, was a watershed moment for copyright law; 
Napster helped bring digital piracy into the mainstream.25  The 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), a music industry 
trade group, responded to a perceived increase in copyright 
violations with a flood of lawsuits beginning in 2003.26  These lawsuits 
were largely designed to dissuade potential illegal downloading by 
threatening litigation and raising awareness of the illegality of most 
file-sharing.27  But after suing approximately 35,000 individuals 
during the ensuing five years, the RIAA officially announced the end 
of its copyright litigation campaign in December 2008.28  Some 
commentators attributed the “sudden shift” in strategy to the high 
financial costs involved, negative associated public relations, and 
overall ineffectiveness at preventing illegal downloading.29 
Despite the RIAA’s absence, copyright litigation has soared in 
the past few years largely due to pockets of the film industry taking 
over where the RIAA left off.30  Indeed, since the beginning of 2010, 
well over 200,000 individual defendants have been sued in the United 
 
everyone agrees with this “piracy hurts sales” conclusion.  See Music Sales are not 
Affected by Web Piracy, Study Finds, BBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk 
/news/technology-21856720 (reporting on a study of 16,000 Europeans—which the 
IFPI called “flawed and misleading”—concluding that music sales are not hampered 
by digital piracy). 
 24  See generally Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 63, 66–67 (2002–2003) (noting the “limited capacity of existing legal 
protections to combat digital piracy”) (internal citation omitted). 
 25  See Corey Rayburn, After Napster, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 16, 17 (2001) (describing 
Napster—even in its “defunct state”—as a “cultural phenomenon”). 
 26  RIAA v. The People, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 30, 2008), 
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later. 
 27  Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 19, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137 
.html. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  One judge characterized the trend as a “nationwide blizzard of civil actions 
brought by purveyors of pornographic films alleging copyright infringement by 
individuals.”  In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 61447, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012).  Another judge described the 
plaintiffs in these cases as “copyright locusts [who] have descended on the federal 
courts” and further lamented that “[i]t is difficult to even imagine the extraordinary 
amount of time federal judges have spent on these cases.”  Opinion & Order at 3, 3, 
n.2, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–4, No. 1:12-cv-02962-HB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 
2012), ECF No. 11. 
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States for allegedly sharing copyrighted material online and this 
number continues to grow.31  Instead of the drawn out32 and 
expensive33 courtroom-oriented strategy employed by the RIAA, the 
recent crop of BitTorrent copyright litigation relies almost exclusively 
on pre-trial settlements and thereby completely avoids litigation.34  
The likely logic of this litigation strategy, which has been dubbed the 
“settlement letter factory” business model,35 is that collecting small 
settlement payments from a large pool of alleged infringers is 
preferable to large payments from a small amount of proven 
infringers.  The adult movie industry, for example, views this 
innovative litigation strategy as a potentially lucrative new revenue 
stream.36  Those who file BitTorrent copyright lawsuits are often 
referred to as “copyright trolls.”37  Copyright trolls have caused a 
 
 31  Ernesto, 200,000 BitTorrent Users Sued in the United States, TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 
8, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/200000-bittorrent-users-sued-in-the-united-states-
110808/. 
 32  See, e.g., the docket report for Capitol Records et al. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 
0:06-cv-01497-MJD-LIB (D. Minn. Apr. 19, 2006), a notorious music file-sharing case 
that lasted nearly seven years. 
 33  One analysis looked at the RIAA’s IRS Form 990 filings between 2004 and 
2008 and found that “the RIAA spent roughly $90 million on legal fees to recover 
$2.5 million.”  James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass 
Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 85 n.42 
(2012). 
 34  See Nate Anderson, The “Legal Blackmail” Business: Inside a P2P Settlement Factory, 
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 29, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/09 
/amounts-to-blackmail-inside-a-p2p-settlement-letter-factory.ars. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Nicholas Deleon, Adult Movie Industry Follows RIAA’s Footsteps, Sees Lawsuits as 
New Revenue Source, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 31, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/01 
/31/adult-movie-industry-follows-riaas-footsteps-sees-lawsuits-as-new-revenue-source/; 
Eriq Gardner, New Litigation Campaign Quietly Targets Tens of Thousands of Movie 
Downloaders, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com 
/blogs/thr-esq/litigation-campaign-quietly-targets-tens-63769 (quoting an attorney 
working in the field of BitTorrent copyright litigation as saying: “We’re creating a 
revenue stream and monetizing the equivalent of an alternative distribution 
channel”). 
 37  See, e.g., James DeBriyn, supra note 33, at 86 (“A copyright troll is a plaintiff 
who seeks damages for infringement upon a copyright it owns, not to be made 
whole, but rather as a primary or supplemental revenue stream.”); Jason R. LaFond, 
Personal Jurisdiction and Joinder in Mass Copyright Troll Litigation, 71 MD. L. REV. 
ENDNOTES 51, 55 (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcont 
ent.cgi?article=1019&context=endnotes (“A copyright troll, roughly defined, is a 
person or entity that acquires a (usually narrow) license from an original copyright 
holder for the sole purpose of suing and obtaining settlements from alleged 
infringers.”); Who are copyright trolls?, FIGHT COPYRIGHT TROLLS, 
http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2012) (“Copyright trolls 
are law firms or individual lawyers who adopted a lucrative scheme to profit from 
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“disruption of the under-enforcement equilibrium” that has 
historically existed in copyright law.38  Moreover, because copyright 
trolls “have in theory violated none of the law’s formal rules and 
principles, copyright law has thus far failed to articulate a coherent 
basis on which to curb their activities.”39 
This Comment takes the position that the unscrupulous activities 
of copyright trolls should be curbed.  Part II of this Comment will 
look at the business model used by copyright trolls involved in 
BitTorrent copyright litigation.  The most crucial aspects of “the 
settlement letter factory” model are highlighted, including: joining 
together alleged infringers of the copyrighted work into a single 
lawsuit for discovery purposes; expedited discovery requests to reveal 
the true identities of the anonymous defendants; and the sending of 
ominous settlement offers that are designed to induce settlement 
without the need for trial.  Part III sets forth a multi-faceted and 
pragmatic approach to help eradicate the problem of copyright trolls.  
The solution is grounded in the acknowledgment of the vastly 
different stakeholders involved—indeed, for every copyright troll 
hoping to extort easy money out of unsuspecting citizens, there is 
likely a genuine content creator interested in protecting the market 
for his work.  Similarly, for every factually innocent defendant who 
should not be made to choose between fighting the false charges in 
court or settling, there is likely a bona fide copyright infringer who 
knowingly and willingly broke the law and thus should be punished.  
The solution attempts to balance these competing interests by 
showing different ways in which the copyright troll can be hindered 
while still leaving the core of copyright enforcement intact.  The 
solution encourages judges to inquire into the motives and practices 
of BitTorrent copyright plaintiffs, and emphasizes the discretion 
judges have over such cases.  Part IV concludes that copyright 
protections should be encouraged in the digital age but that there is 
fine line between overzealous copyright defenders and copyright 
trolls. 
 
copyright infringement allegations through extortion.  Copyright trolls represent 
holders of copyrights on movies (mostly pornography).”). 
 38  Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6–7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150716.  Balganesh observes that “the troll’s actions 
convert copyright law’s previously actionable but tolerated claims into actionable and 
enforced ones, disrupting the implicit equilibrium.”  Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). 
 39  Id. at 7. 
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II.  THE BITTORRENT COPYRIGHT TROLL BUSINESS MODEL 
Law firms that specialize in BitTorrent copyright litigation40 are 
often referred to as “settlement factories” or “copyright trolls,” and 
use a “payup or we’ll getcha” method designed to induce alleged 
infringers to settle outside of court.41  Once a defendant is identified, 
the plaintiff will offer to settle the matter outside of court for a 
relatively small fee (usually a few thousand dollars),42 with the threat 
of litigation and its associated stress and expenses hanging over the 
defendant’s head.43  Many alleged infringers—even the factually 
innocent—settle the claim since fighting the allegation in court could 
result in legal bills of tens of thousands of dollars—many times 
greater than the settlement demand.44  Although settlement rates are 
usually a closely-guarded secret, one copyright troll “bragged” that 
forty-five percent of alleged infringers accepted offers of settlement,45 
while another estimated he has made “[m]ore than a few million 
[dollars]” settling these suits.46 
Copyright trolls generally follow the same procedural pattern in 
their efforts to elicit settlements from alleged infringers.  The first 
 
 40  For a list of major players in the area, see generally, Discussions, FIGHT COPYRIGHT 
TROLLS, http://fightcopyrighttrolls.com/discussions/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).  
Prenda Law is one of the most notorious copyright trolls.  For example, in early 2012, 
Prenda Law listed 118 cases in response to a court’s request for “[a] list of the 
BitTorrent copyright infringement cases involving multiple joined John Doe 
Defendants . . . .”  See Ex. A to Declaration of Charles E. Piehl in Response to Minute 
Order at 4–6, AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–135, No. 5:11-cv-03336 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 
2012), ECF No. 43.  Prenda’s operations, however, were dealt a significant blow in 
early May 2013 and their trolling days appear to be numbered.  See Joe Mullin, Prenda 
Hammered: Judge Sends Porn-Trolling Lawyers to Criminal Investigators, ARSTECHNICA (May 
6, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/prenda-hammered-judge-
sends-porn-trolling-lawyers-to-criminal-investigators/.  However, despite the likely 
absence of one of BitTorrent copyright trolling’s most notorious law firms, the 
underlying law remains the same—and the problem of BitTorrent copyright trolling 
remains unsolved. 
 41  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 34. 
 42  In one example, the plaintiff sought $3,400 from the alleged illegal 
downloader.  See Offer Letter, supra note 4, at 2. 
 43  Id. 
 44  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 34. 
 45  Mick Haig Prods., e.K. v. John Does 1–670, No. 3:10-cv-1900-N, 2011 WL 
5104095, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011).  This attorney, however, received 
$10,000 in sanctions for his “staggering chutzpah” relating to his issuing of 670 
unauthorized subpoenas.  See Mick Haig Prods. E.K. v. Does 1–670, 687 F.3d 649 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 46  Kashmir Hill, How Porn Copyright Lawyer John Steele Has Made a ‘Few Million 
Dollars’ Pursuing (Sometimes Innocent) ‘Porn Pirates’, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/10/15/how-porn-copyright-lawyer-
john-steele-justifies-his-pursuit-of-sometimes-innocent-porn-pirates/2/. 
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step is to find a copyright holder willing to sue infringers for illegal 
use of a copyrighted work.47  Proponents of the “settlement letter 
factory” business model often base lawsuits on embarassing films, 
such as pornographic movies, in order to maximize the lawsuits’ 
shock value and effectiveness.48  The logic is clear: the more 
embarrassing the film, the more willing the alleged infringer will be 
to accept the settlement offer, so as to avoid being associated with 
such questionable content.49 
After identifying which copyrighted work or works will serve as 
the basis for the lawsuit, the second step is to find alleged infringers 
to name in the lawsuit.50  To expedite the process, copyright holders 
utilize companies that specialize in monitoring and tracking P2P 
networks and illegal downloads.51  These companies, like 
GuardaLey,52 use proprietary software to identify defendants.53  This 
software will allegedly identify and record the Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses54 of the suspected infringers and other pertinent data, such 
 
 47  Some copyright trolls will obtain part of the copyright via assignment and file 
as plaintiff.  This act of “unbundling” is explicitly recognized by Congress and the 
Supreme Court.  See New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 484 (2001) 
(“The 1976 [Copyright] Act recast the copyright as a bundle of discrete ‘exclusive 
rights,’ § 106, each of which ‘may be transferred . . . and owned separately,’ § 
201(d)(2).”).  This was the strategy employed by Righthaven, LLC, although it 
partially led to their demise because their assignments did not follow the precise 
letter of the law.  See Balganesh, supra note 38, at 18–20.  To avoid potential 
complications, then, an easy workaround is to avoid assignment of the copyright and 
have the copyright owner file as plaintiff, presumably splitting any profits after the 
fact.  Balganesh thus appears mistaken when he writes that “copyright trolling 
depends entirely on the transferability of actionable copyright claims.”  Balganesh, 
supra note 38, at 29. 
 48  See, e.g., Complaint at 7, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-
02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 (listing the copyrighted motion 
picture Tiffany Sex With a Supermodel as the basis for the lawsuit). 
 49  Electronic Frontier Foundation Intellectual Property Director Corynne 
McSherry has said that the “added pressure of embarrassment associated with 
pornography . . . can convince those ensnared in the suits to quickly pay what’s 
demanded of them, whether or not they have legitimate defenses.  That’s why it’s so 
important to make sure the process is fair.”  Nate Anderson, Lawyer Can’t Handle 
Opposition, Gives Up on P2P Porn Lawsuit, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/lawyers-cant-handle-opposition-give-
up-on-p2p-porn-lawsuit/. 
 50  Anderson, supra note 34. 
 51  Id. 
 52  See GUARDALEY, http://www.guardaley.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) 
(“GuardaLey uses the most innovative techniques in order to protect your 
investments and products including: pictures, video games, software, music and 
movies.”). 
 53  Id. 
 54  An IP address is a unique identifying number which every network-connected 
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as the date and time that the alleged infringement took place.55 
The third step is to seek joinder of the anonymous defendants 
via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2).56  Joining the 
defendants together into a single action allows the plaintiff to seek 
damages from all alleged infringers simultaneously, which in turn 
allows the copyright troll to maximize return on investment.  The 
filing fee in federal court for a copyright claim is $350 per action.57  
Thus, plaintiffs can realize astronomical cost savings when courts 
allow joinder.  For example, one consolidated order granting joinder 
of 5,583 unnamed defendants in three separate cases saved the 
plaintiff nearly $2 million in filing fees.58 
The fourth step is to learn the true identities of the anonymous 
“John Doe” defendants.59  This is perhaps the most crucial step—
without this identifying information, the settlement letters cannot be 
sent and the copyright troll business model would simply fall apart.60  
 
device must have in order to communicate with other devices on that network.  What 
is an IP Address?, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet 
/basics/question549.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).  One commentator has likened 
it to a social security number.  Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the 
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1739 (2010).  For Internet 
users using a computer to connect to the Internet, their Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) will provide them with an IP address.  Id.  It is possible to use “geolocation” 
services to find a largely accurate answer to where an IP address is based, such as a 
particular city, but an IP address alone is not enough to show that the account holder 
acted illegally.  See Order & Report & Recommendation at 6–8, In re BitTorrent Adult 
Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 2:11-cv-03995-DRH-GRB (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 
2012), ECF No. 39 (outlining reasons why an IP address alone is insufficient to 
identify the infringer). 
 55  See, e.g., Ex. A to Complaint at 17, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 
5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 (listing IP address, date and 
time of alleged infringement, city, state, ISP, and network type). 
 56  Examples of seeking joinder in these types of cases are too numerous to list 
here, but see, e.g., Complaint at 7, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-
cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 (justifying the joinder of the 
twenty-two defendants pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)). 
 57  See, e.g., Fee Schedule – Effective April, 17, 2012, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLO., http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Fees.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 
2012); see also the docket text associated with Complaint, Malibu Media, LLC v. John 
Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2012), ECF No. 1 (noting the 
“Filing fee $ 350 receipt number PPE061599”). 
 58  Cf. Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 22, 2011). 
 59  This Comment uses both “John Doe” and “Doe” interchangeably in reference 
to the anonymous defendants sued in these lawsuits. 
 60  See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 
Serve Third Party Subpoenas Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference at 3, Malibu Media, 
LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2012), ECF No. 4 
(“Without this [identifying] information, Plaintiff cannot serve the Defendants nor 
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As the provider of the IP address, Internet Service Providers61 (ISPs) 
are the only source of this identifying information.62  An ISP can 
match a particular IP address with the name, address, telephone 
number, email address, and Media Access Control (MAC) address63 of 
the subscriber assigned to it when the alleged illegal downloading 
took place.  ISPs, however, often hesitate to comply with copyright 
trolls because of the “undue burden” of compliance, generally 
because of time and financial costs, as well as privacy concerns.64  
Thus, in response to such hesitation, copyright trolls generally file an 
ex parte motion for expedited discovery in conjunction with a request 
to subpoena the ISPs to compel them to turn over the identifying 
information.65  Courts generally grant these expedited discovery 
 
pursue this lawsuit to protect its valuable copyrights [Tiffany Sex With a Supermodel].”).  
Because this stage is so crucial for the copyright troll, some have argued that at this 
stage the court should sua sponte determine whether joinder and personal 
jurisdiction are appropriate.  LaFond, supra note 37, at 54. 
 61  An ISP is “any organization through which you can arrange Internet access.”  
What is an Internet service provider?, IND. U.: U. INFO. TECH. SERVS. (May 17, 2011), 
http://kb.iu.edu/data/ahoz.html.  They are typically commercial in nature and 
some examples include Time Warner, Comcast, and Verizon.  Id. 
 62  See, e.g., Raw Films, Ltd. v. Does 1–11, No. 12-cv-368–WQH (NLS), 2012 WL 
684763, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (“Because the transactions in question 
occurred entirely online, the defendants have been elusive and the IP addresses and 
ISP are the only available identifying information.  Without the requested discovery 
[compelling the ISP to identify the users behind the IP addresses], there are no other 
measures Plaintiff can take to identify the personal information for the Doe defendants.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 63  MAC addresses “allow computers to uniquely identify themselves on a 
network . . . .  The MAC address generally remains fixed and follows the network 
device, but the IP address changes as the network device moves from one network to 
another.”  Bradley Mitchell, The MAC Address — An Introduction to MAC Addressing, 
ABOUT.COM, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/networkprotocolsip/l/aa0622 
02a.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).  Thus, the MAC address identifies the specific 
computer that was allegedly used in the infringing activity. 
 64  See, e.g., Reply in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoenas Issued to Non-Party 
Internet Service Providers Bright House Networks, LLC et al. at 2, AF Holdings LLC 
v. Does 1–1,058, No. 1:12-cv-00048-BAH (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2012), ECF No. 26; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Third Party Time Warner 
Cable Inc.’s Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena at 9–10, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino 
Beteiligungs GBMH & Co. KG v. Does 1–2,094, No. 10-453, 2010 WL 2553275 
(D.D.C. May 13, 2010). 
 65  See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 
Serve Third Party Subpoenas Prior to a Rule 26(f) Conference at 3, Malibu Media, 
LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2012), ECF No. 4 
(“Plaintiff seeks leave of Court to serve a Rule 45 subpoena on the ISPs and any 
related intermediary ISPs.  Any such subpoena will demand the true name, address, 
telephone number, e-mail address and [MAC] address of the Defendant to whom 
the ISP issued an IP address.”). 
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motions,66 especially because ISPs retain logs of the activity of IP 
addresses for only a limited time.67 
Once the true identities of the Doe defendants are known, the 
fifth and final step is to elicit settlements from the alleged 
infringers.68  As described above, these settlement offers will give the 
defendants the opportunity to settle the case for a relatively 
inexpensive fee.69  At the same time, the offer will remind the 
defendant of the risks associated with appearing in court, including 
time, money, and reputation costs.70  If the alleged infringer agrees to 
the settlement payment, the plaintiff will voluntarily dismiss that 
particular Doe from the lawsuit with prejudice.71 
Very few of these actions, if any, reach the trial stage.72  This is 
 
 66  See, e.g., AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–96, No. C-11-03335, 2011 WL 4502413, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2011) (“When a defendant’s identify is not known at the time 
a complaint is filed, courts often grant plaintiffs early discovery to determine the doe 
defendants’ identities.”). 
 67  See, e.g., Data Retention, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, 
http://epic.org/privacy/intl/data_retention.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 68  See Offer Letter, supra note 4; Nate Anderson, Settle Up: Voicemails Show P2P 
Porn Law Firms in Action, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/04/settle-up-voicemails-show-p2p-porn-
law-firms-in-action/. 
 69  See sources cited supra note 68. 
 70  See sources cited supra note 68. 
 71  See, e.g., Memorandum RE: Outstanding Motions, Expedited Discovery, and 
Bellwether Trial at 6–7, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-
MMB (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2012), ECF No. 29 [hereinafter Bellwether Trial Memo] 
(“Plaintiff’s counsel candidly advised the Court that . . . [i]f the John Doe defendant 
who receives the letter agrees to pay, Plaintiff dismisses the complaint against that 
defendant with prejudice and without any further court proceedings, thus avoiding 
the public disclosure of the defendant’s identity.”).  Cf. Plaintiff’s Notice of 
Settlement and Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice of John Doe 6 Only at 1, Malibu 
Media, LLC v. John Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2012), ECF 
No. 16 (“Plaintiff has settled this matter with John Doe 6 (‘Defendant’).  Pursuant to 
the settlement agreement’s terms, Plaintiff hereby voluntary [sic] dismisses 
Defendant from this action with prejudice.”) (emphasis in original). 
 72  Despite filing claims against over 15,000 alleged illegal downloaders, Prenda 
Law admitted that “no defendants have been served” in their BitTorrent actions.  Ex. 
A to Declaration of Charles E. Piehl in Response to Minute Order at 4–6, AF 
Holdings LLC v. Does 1–135, No. 5:11-cv-03336 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012), ECF No. 
43.  Additionally, Patrick Collins, Inc. “has sued at least 11,570 John Doe Defendants 
in litigation around the country without ever serving a single defendant.”  Order on 
Pending Motions for Ex Parte Discovery and Order to Show Cause at 5, Patrick 
Collins, Inc. v. Does 1–79, No. 1:12-cv-10532-GAO (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2012), ECF No. 
51.  See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation, and American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation’s 
Capital in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoenas Issued to Non-Party Internet 
Service Providers at 2, AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1–1058, No. 1:12-cv-00048 (BAH) 
(D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2012), ECF No. 24 [hereinafter Brief of Amici]; Amicus Curiae 
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not surprising since trial is not the true goal of this litigation.73  
Instead, the goal is to obtain the true identities of the anonymous IP 
addresses in the least expensive way possible in order to maximize the 
copyright troll’s return on investment in the settlement letters.74 
III.  A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The difficult starting point for analyzing BitTorrent copyright 
litigation is acknowledging the difference between copyright trolls 
and more “legitimate” copyright holders.75  Additionally, the levels of 
culpability among a given pool of alleged illegal downloaders most 
likely varies widely: for every “Adrienne Neal” who is factually 
innocent and has never even heard of the copyrighted material in 
question, let alone intentionally downloaded it, there is presumably a 
sophisticated pirate who is factually guilty and deserves punishment.76  
 
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Brief Requesting Reconsideration and Stay of Dec. 
21 Order at 1, Hard Drive Productions, Inc. v. Does 1–1495, No. 1:11-cv-01741 
(D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2012). 
 73  Bellwether Trial Memo, supra note 71, at 6–7 (“Plaintiff’s counsel candidly 
advised the Court that the Plaintiff’s strategy is, after initiating the lawsuits, to seek 
leave to serve third-party subpoenas on the ISPs to obtain identification information 
for the IP addresses specified in Exhibit A to the Complaints.  When Plaintiff receives 
this information from the ISPs, it contacts the subscribers associated with the IP 
addresses, usually by letter, advising them of the lawsuits and offering them the 
opportunity to settle by payment of a monetary sum.”). 
 74  See id.; Brief of Amici, supra note 72, at 2. 
 75  Although the line is admittedly blurry, copyright trolls might be characterized 
as plaintiffs who leverage the significant damages available to copyright holders to 
extract quick settlements, whereas a legitimate copyright plaintiff could be a content 
creator who is genuinely interested in protecting the inherent or market value of his 
or her work.  Balganesh gets to the heart of the matter by analyzing incentive 
structures: 
The traditional copyright owner’s decision whether to enforce an 
actionable claim or not is thought to derive primarily (though not 
exclusively) from copyright’s fundamental purposes as an inducement 
for creativity.  Commencing an action for infringement is presumed to 
be a viable option principally when the harm from such infringement 
interferes in some way with (or is likely to interfere with) the market 
for creative works.  A copyright owner’s decision to sue a copier thus 
represents the belief that the copying in question is harming the 
owner’s ability to exploit the market for the copyrighted work. . . . 
What makes the troll’s disruption of the under-enforcement 
equilibrium problematic then is the fact that its reasons for doing so 
bear no relationship whatsoever to the market for creative works . . . . 
Its incentives to sue for copyright infringement emanate from 
motivations that diverge rather fundamentally from the social reasons 
for the very existence of the copyright system. 
Balganesh, supra note 38, at 6–7 (internal citations omitted). 
 76  To further complicate the matter, it is likely that any sophisticated pirate who 
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Courts are thus divided on how to best preside over these types of 
cases.77  The disparate parties and stakeholders involved make it 
difficult to precisely formulate a “silver bullet” solution.78  Instead, the 
best way to eliminate copyright trolls is through a combination of 
safeguards that judges can use at their discretion after applying a 
“smell test.”79  Because the copyright trolls in these lawsuits “have in 
theory violated none of the law’s formal rules and principles,”80 a 
“smell test” is necessary to determine the true motives of the plaintiff.  
Although courts cannot ignore an allegation of copyright 
infringement, a judge can use his discretion over matters such as 
joinder, right to anonymity, and statutory damages to rein in 
copyright trolls if the judge has reason to believe that the plaintiff is 
abusing the rules of procedure in order to obtain names and 
addresses to send threatening settlement offers. 
 
 
is most deserving of punishment uses a Virtual Private Network (VPN) that prevents 
them from being caught.  A VPN “is a private network that uses a public network 
(usually the Internet) to connect remote sites or users together. . . . [A]nyone 
intercepting the encrypted data can’t read it.”  Jeff Tyson & Stephanie Crawford, 
How VPNs Work, HOW STUFF WORKS (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.howstuffworks.com 
/vpn.htm; see also Alan Henry, Why You Should Start Using a VPN (and How to Choose the 
Best One for Your Needs), LIFEHACKER (Sept. 5, 2012, 8:00 AM), 
http://lifehacker.com/5940565/why-you-should-start-using-a-vpn-and-how-to-choose-
the-best-one-for-your-needs (“VPNs are the only way to stay safe when using 
something like BitTorrent—everything else is just a false sense of security.  Better 
safe than trying to defend yourself in court or paying a massive fine for something 
you may or may not have even done, right?”). 
 77  See cases discussed infra.  As of this writing, no case involving John Doe 
defendants accused of violating copyright by using BitTorrent has been decided on 
the merits at an appellate level—which is not surprising since no case has been fully 
litigated.  One case of particular interest, however, is Malibu Media, LLC v. John 
Does 1–22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 19, 2012).  In that case, Judge 
Baylson has taken the unusual step of ordering a bellwether trial, currently 
scheduled to begin after this Comment has gone to print.  See Bellwether Trial 
Memo, supra note 71; Revised Scheduling Order, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–
22, No. 5:12-cv-02088-MMB (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2013), ECF No. 86.  “In a bellwether 
trial procedure, a random sample of cases large enough to yield reliable results is 
tried to a jury.  A judge, jury, or participating lawyers use the resulting verdicts as a 
basis for resolving the remaining cases.”  Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577 (2008). 
 78  A “silver bullet” is “a quick solution to a difficult problem.”  Silver Bullet, 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/silver+bullet (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2013). 
 79  As used in this context, the “smell test” involves an ad hoc evaluation of the 
plaintiff that takes into consideration factors such as the underlying copyrighted 
work and the plaintiff’s willingness to litigate the matter through trial. 
 80  Balganesh, supra note 38, at 7. 
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A.  Joinder Must at Least be Limited to Only Those Who Reside in the 
District in Which the Lawsuit is Pending 
As described above, copyright trolls will usually seek to join 
numerous anonymous Doe defendants together into a single lawsuit 
under Rule 20.81  This part will (1) give a refresher on the legal 
concepts implicated, (2) briefly trace the evolution of file-sharing and 
give an overview of BitTorrent technology, and (3) then argue that 
wholesale joinder of anonymous IP addresses is inappropriate. 
1. Joinder and Personal Jurisdiction 
A 2001 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
made those rules unequivocally applicable to copyright litigation.82  
Rule 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants in one 
action if: “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all 
defendants will arise in the action.”83  Under Rule 20(b), however, 
joinder is not mandatory.84  Even if the Rule 20(a)(2) conditions are 
met, the court may order separate trials to protect any party against 
“embarrassment, delay, expense, or other prejudice.”85  Moreover, 
permissive joinder under Rule 20 must “comport with the principles 
of fundamental fairness.”86  The court is permitted to sever 
improperly joined parties at any time, as long as the severance is on 
just terms and the entire action is not dismissed outright.87  A 
decision to sever is made on the court’s own motion or on a party’s 
motion.88 
When considering joinder in the context of BitTorrent 
 
 81  See supra Part II. 
 82  See FED. R. CIV. P. 81 advisory committee’s note (“Former Copyright Rule 1 
made the Civil Rules applicable to copyright proceedings except to the extent the 
Civil Rules were inconsistent with Copyright Rules.  Abrogation of the Copyright 
Rules leaves the Civil Rules fully applicable to copyright proceedings.  Rule 81(a)(1) 
is amended to reflect this change.”). 
 83  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). 
 84  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b). 
 85  Id. 
 86  Coleman v. Quaker Oats, 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 
citation omitted).  Although the Supreme Court has held that “joinder of claims, 
parties and remedies is strongly encouraged,” joinder must remain “consistent with 
fairness to the parties.”  United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 
(1966). 
 87  FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 88  Id. 
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copyright litigation, it is important to keep the concept of personal 
jurisdiction in mind.  Without personal jurisdiction, a court lacks the 
power to impose its decisions on a particular party.89  Although 
modern personal jusrisdiction jurisprudence is not straightforward,90 
generally, in order for a court to have personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant, the defendant must: consent to or waive personal 
jurisdiction;91 be present or domiciled in the jurisdiction;92 have 
certain minimum contacts with the jurisdiction;93 or have a 
reasonable expectation of facing suit in the jurisdiction.94  Personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence is grounded largely in the U.S. 
Constitution via the Due Process Clause and much of the analysis 
focuses on whether subjecting the defendant to suit in a particular 
jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”95  Although courts generally do not have the 
authority to dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction sua sponte,96 
such an analysis is indeed proper when a defendant does not appear 
and the court is determining whether to award a default judgment.97 
2. The Evolution of File-Sharing and an Explanation of 
the BitTorrent Protocol98 
The underlying file-sharing technology that many use to illegally 
download copyrighted works99 has become more advanced over the 
years—it is now easier for users to download copyrighted works, while 
 
 89  LARRY R. TEPLY, RALPH U. WHITTEN & DENIS F. MCLAUGHLIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
CASES, TEXT, NOTES, AND PROBLEMS 28 (2d ed. 2008). 
 90  Bryce A. Lenox, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Teaching the Stream of 
Commerce Dog New Tricks: CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), 
22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 333 (1997) (“The path of personal jurisdiction over the 
last century has been a rocky one . . . .”). 
 91  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1). 
 92  Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–64 (1940). 
 93  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 94  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 95  Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463. 
 96  Pilgrim Badge & Label Corp. v. Barrios, 857 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]he 
caselaw appears uniform in concluding that a district court has no authority, sua 
sponte, to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.”). 
 97  See, e.g., Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 
214 (2d Cir. 2010); Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 
1986). 
  98  For a video explanation of BitTorrent, see David King, BitTorrent, Explained, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYTvTPrgSiM (uploaded Oct. 12, 
2010). 
 99  File-sharing is not the only way to illegally obtain copyrighted works on the 
Internet, but the legal issue discussed in this Comment is exclusive to it. 
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it is harder to simply shut down an illegal service in the hopes of 
stemming the tide of digital piracy.100 
Since the early 1980s, the “traditional” client-server model has 
disseminated data across networks.101  In a traditional file-transfer 
process, a file is stored on a server and the server is stored on a 
network, such as the Internet.102  Other computers connected to that 
network can send messages to the host server, letting it know that it 
would like to copy the stored file.103  When a connection is established 
between the host server and the requesting computer, the requesting 
computer becomes a “client” and copies the file from the host 
server.104  The traditional model is completely one-sided in the sense 
that the client never shares any of its resources, such as processing 
power or hard-drive space.105  Even though an individual client may 
only consume a small amount of bandwidth106 in this traditional 
scenario, the host server can consume extraordinary amounts of 
bandwidth if many clients attempt to obtain the file from the host.107  
Therefore, in order to reduce the cost of bandwidth consumption, 
host servers will often put a cap on the number of clients that can 
simultaneously obtain the file, in addition to putting a cap on how 
fast each client can download the file.108  A common example of the 
traditional model is a website such as http://www.espn.com, which 
resides on the Internet and stores all of the associated files (photos, 
audio, video, etc.) on its server.109  When the client requests a certain 
page of the website by clicking on a link, for example, the server 
responds by sending the page and all associated content, such as 
 
 100  See, e.g., Ernesto, Anonymous, Decentralized and Uncensored File-Sharing is Booming, 
TORRENTFREAK (Mar. 3, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-decentralized-
and-uncensored-file-sharing-is-booming-120302/. 
 101  Ankur R. Patel, BitTorrent Beware: Legitimizing BitTorrent Against Secondary 
Copyright Liability, 10 APPALACHIAN J.L. 117, 118 (2010–2011) (citing WEIJIA JIA & 
WANLEI ZHOU, DISTRIBUTED NETWORK SYSTEMS: FROM CONCEPTS TO IMPLEMENTATIONS 6 
(2004)). 
 102  Michael Brown, White Paper: How BitTorrent Works, MAXIMUMPC (July 10, 2009, 
7:00 AM), http://www.maximumpc.com/article/features/white_paper_bittorrent. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Patel, supra note 101, at 119. 
 106  “Bandwidth is a term used to describe how much information can be 
transmitted over a connection.”  What is Bandwidth?, WISEGEEK, 
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-bandwidth.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).  It is 
usually expressed as “bits per second” and so the greater the bandwidth, the greater 
the data transfer.  Id. 
 107  Brown, supra note 102. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Patel, supra note 101, at 119. 
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photos or videos.110 
P2P sharing eliminates the need for a central server to host 
files.111  Instead, the files are stored on the individual users’ 
computers; when one downloads a file on a P2P network, he or she 
downloads the file from another user of the P2P network instead of 
downloading the file from a central location.112  Every member, or 
“peer,” acts as both a client (by requesting data from other peers) 
and as a server (by contributing a portion of their computing 
resources to the network as a whole).113  Napster is one of the earliest 
and most influential examples of P2P technology.114  In a typical 
Napster transaction, Peer A would request a file from Peer B, who 
stored the file on his own computer.115  Peer B would respond by 
sending the file; Peer A would assist by contributing a portion of its 
resources to the transaction.116  Napster, however, suffered from a 
limitation because it used a central server to keep track of connected 
computers and the files available on them.117  Napster’s central server 
was its downfall—a court construed the central server as evidence 
that Napster knowingly facilitated copyright infringement.118 
BitTorrent is a protocol119 that does not rely on a central server 
to establish download connections for users—a distinct advantage 
over earlier P2P software such as Napster.120  Instead, it decentralizes 
data among the users.121  This decentralized approach makes it 
virtually impossible to shut down BitTorrent, since no central server 
maintains a comprehensive index of active users.122  Furthermore, 
 
 110  Id. 
 111  Jeff Tyson, How the Old Napster Worked, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://www.howstuffworks.com/napster.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
 112  Id. 
 113  Patel, supra note 101, at 119. 
 114  See generally HILLARY J. MORGAN, NAPSTER’S INFLUENCE ON INTERNET COPYRIGHT 
LAW (2002); Symposium, Beyond Napster: Debating the Future of Copyright on the Internet, 
50 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (2001).. 
 115  Tyson, supra note 111. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Brown, supra note 102. 
 118  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part sub nom., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
 119  BitTorrent is a “set of rules” that allows for this certain type of file-sharing.  
Carmen Carmack, How BitTorrent Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/bittorrent.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2013). 
 120  Brown, supra note 102. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
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BitTorrent overcomes the speed limitations associated with the 
traditional client-server method; it breaks down a larger file into 
smaller component pieces, which each user, or peer, can then 
share.123  Once a user has downloaded all of the components to his 
computer, they are reassembled back into the original file.124  
Practically speaking, the more popular a file, the faster it will 
download because additional “peers” increase the ability to download 
all the component pieces.125  This ease of use and potentially 
increased download speed has made BitTorrent an attractive option 
for those seeking to download copyrighted works.  Even though there 
are legal uses for BitTorrent software,126 a Princeton student’s 2010 
study found that eighty-five to ninety-nine percent of files distributed 
by BitTorrent infringed copyright.127  As a result, some in the content 
industry believe that BitTorrent is to stealing movies what “bolt-
cutters are to stealing bicycles.”128  
BitTorrent requires that one person act as an initial “seed” and 
make the entire file available to the network.129  In order to share a 
file via BitTorrent, the person offering the initial file—the “seeder”—
must first create a “.torrent” file,130 which contains information on the 
 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. (“Each peer distributing a file breaks it into chunks ranging from 64KB to 
4MB in size and creates a checksum for each chunk using a hashing algorithm.  
When another peer receives these chunks, it matches its checksum to the checksum 
recorded in the torrent file to verify its integrity.”). 
 125  Brown, supra note 102.  Furthermore, generally a peer “who contributes 
quickly tends to receive quickly,” thus incentivizing users to devote more bandwidth 
to the exchange.  Michael Piatek et al., Building BitTyrant, a (More) Strategic BitTorrent 
Client, 32 LOGIN 8, 10 (2007), available at http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/arv 
ind/papers/login-bt.pdf. 
 126  See, e.g., Janko Roettgers, 10 More Sites for Free and Legal Torrents, GIGAOM (Feb. 
5, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://gigaom.com/video/ten-more-sites-for-free-and-legal-
torrents/. 
 127  ROBERT LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE 
CULTURE BUSINESS AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK 55 (2011). 
 128  Targeting Websites Dedicated To Stealing American Intellectual Property: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Scott Turow, 
President, Authors Guild), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-2-
16%20Turow%20Testimony.pdf. 
 129  Brown, supra note 102. 
 130  The .torrent file may become a thing of the past with the dissemination of 
“magnet links” on index sites such as The Pirate Bay.  This is designed to make such 
index sites less vulnerable to lawsuits.  See, e.g., Ernesto, The Pirate Bay Says Goodbye to 
(Most) Torrents on February 29, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 13, 2012), 
http://torrentfreak.com/the-pirate-bay-says-goodbye-to-most-torrents-on-february-29-
120213/.  The analysis, however, does not change for the end-user named in 
BitTorrent lawsuits, so the switch from .torrent files to magnet links is not of huge 
concern for this Comment. 
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“tracker”131 and metadata132 about the underlying file, such as the size 
of the component pieces.133  Someone wishing to download the 
underlying file (known as a “leecher”) will browse an index site, such 
as The Pirate Bay,134 and locate the desired file.135  Once the .torrent 
file is downloaded, the leecher opens the .torrent file with a 
BitTorrent client,136 which establishes a connection between the 
leecher and the tracker.137  Once the connection to the tracker is 
established, the tracker facilitates and enables the downloading of the 
underlying file, directing the leecher to the location of the 
component pieces.138  As other users (peers) begin downloading the 
file from the initial seed, they simultaneously begin uploading the 
pieces they have already obtained or are in the process of obtaining 
from other peers.139  Accordingly, once a peer has fully downloaded 
the entire file, he also becomes a seed.140  All of the peers, including 
the initial seed, actively engaged in sharing a particular file are 
collectively known as a “swarm.”141  It is not guaranteed, however, that 
every member of a BitTorrent swarm will interact with every other 
 
 131  “A Bit Torrent tracker centrally coordinates the P2P transfer of files among 
users . . . .  Specifically, the tracker identifies the network location of each client . . . 
[and] also tracks which fragment(s) of that file each client possesses, to assist in 
efficient data sharing between clients.”  Bradley Mitchell, What Is a BitTorrent Tracker?, 
ABOUT.COM, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/bittorrent/f/bttracker.htm 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012). 
 132  “Simply put, metadata is data about data.  It is descriptive information about a 
particular data set, object, or resource, including how it is formatted, and when and 
by whom it was collected.”  What is Metadata?, IND. UNIV.: UNIV. INFO. TECH. SERVICES 
(Oct. 22, 2010), http://kb.iu.edu/data/aopm.html. 
 133  Brown, supra note 102. 
 134  The Pirate Bay is “the worlds [sic] largest bittorrent tracker.” About, THE 
PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se/about (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).  According to 
some industry observers, The Pirate Bay had twenty-five million users and 
represented a tenth of all Internet traffic in the fall of 2008.  LEVINE, supra note 127, 
at 203. 
 135  Searching an index site for .torrent files instead of directly searching other 
users’ computers for files to download (as was the case with Napster) provides an 
extra layer of anonymity for BitTorrent users.  WALLACE WANG, STEAL THIS COMPUTER 
BOOK 4.0: WHAT THEY WON’T TELL YOU ABOUT THE INTERNET 79 (4th ed., 2006). 
 136  A BitTorrent client is software that a user will use to facilitate the downloading 
of files from BitTorrent.  For an overview of different clients see Ernesto, BitTorrent 
Client Comparison, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 22, 2006), http://torrentfreak.com/bittorren 
t-client-comparison/. 
 137  Brown, supra note 102. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. 
MORTENSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  2:06 PM 
1124 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1105 
member within that swarm.142 The intersection of this complicated 
technology and antiquted law is where the analysis gets murky. 
3. Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice 
Require that Joinder be Limited 
Judicial opinion is mixed on whether joinder of anonymous 
defendants in a BitTorrent copyright action is appropriate at the 
discovery stage,143 and judges are increasingly recognizing that this is a 
question with no clear answer.144  At the very least, it appears that 
judges are growing more skeptical of joining thousands of 
anonymous defendants together for discovery purposes,145 which is in 
line with the most just reading of the underlying law. 
a.  Rule 20(a)(2) may be Satisfied, But Prejudice Exists 
Under 20(b) 
One downside of allowing wholesale joinder based merely on a 
plaintiff’s allegations that all defendants engaged in the same 
BitTorrent swarm is that it permits the most troubling aspect of the 
“settlement letter factory” business model.  This “worst-case scenario” 
occurs when a factually innocent defendant, from the opposite side 
of the country and without the means or knowledge to defend 
herself, receives a settlement offer in the mail.  This factually 
innocent defendant is forced to choose whether to incur significant 
 
 142  LaFond, supra note 37, at 55 (“An individual device cannot, however, connect 
to all peers in each swarm subset at the same time.  Each peer is allowed to share with 
only a fixed number (usually four) of other peers at a given time.”). 
 143  This is something of an understatement, as some judges reach contrary 
conclusions even to their own prior decisions.  Compare Order, K-Beech, Inc. v. John 
Does 1–36, No. 11-cv-5058 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2011), ECF No. 30 (Kelly, J.) (finding 
joinder improper), and Order, K-Beech, Inc. v. John Does 1–78, No. 11-cv-5060 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 3, 2011), ECF No. 13 (Schiller, J.) (same), with Malibu Media, LLC v. John 
Does 1–15, No. 12-cv-2077, 2012 WL 3089383 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2012) (Kelly, J.) 
(finding joinder proper), and Order, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–15, No. 12-
cv-2090 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 2012), ECF No. 13 (Schiller, J.) (same). 
 144  Opinion & Order at 3, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–4, No. 1:12-cv-
02962-HB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012), ECF No. 11 (“The split in the district courts 
regarding this [joinder] question is not likely to be resolved anytime soon.”); 
Decision and Order at 11, Next Phase Distribution, Inc. v. Does 1–27, No. 1:12-cv-
03755-VM (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012), ECF No. 10 (“The fact that multiple courts, in 
well-reasoned opinions, have arrived at opposing conclusions suggests that there is 
no clearly correct answer to this [joinder] question.”). 
 145  Compare Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1–1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 
(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2011) (finding joinder of 5,583 anonymous defendants proper), 
with Opinion & Order, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–4, No. 1:12-cv-02962-HB 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012), ECF No. 11 (finding joinder of four anonymous defendants 
improper). 
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expense to travel to and defend herself in the district in which the 
lawsuit is pending, or simply comply with the settlement demand to 
make the matter go away.146 
On the other hand, there is merit to the claim that use of 
BitTorrent satisfies the requirements of Rule 20(a)(2) for permissive 
joinder.  Rule 20(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants 
in one action if: “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them 
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences, and (B) any question of law or fact common to all 
defendants will arise in the action.”147  Members of a particular 
BitTorrent swarm can be said to have participated in the “same 
transaction” or “occurrence” which will result in at least one 
“question of law or fact common to all defendants.”  If one views a 
BitTorrent swarm as a “transaction” or “occurrence,” then the IP 
addresses comprising that swarm will be part of the “same 
transaction” or “occurrence.”  It can and should be presumed from a 
plaintiff’s initial complaint that a BitTorrent user affirmatively 
chooses to enter a particular swarm in order to make use of other 
swarm members’ computer resources to download a particular file, 
while at the same time offering up their own computer’s resources to 
facilitate the downloads of other members of the swarm.  Even 
though being part of the same swarm does not guarantee interaction 
between every swarm member,148 plaintiffs should not be required—
for purposes of Rule 20(a)(2) at the initial, nascent stage of 
litigation—to prove that each member of the swarm actually 
connected and swapped bits of data with each other.  Defendants use 
BitTorrent not to swap a file with certain, specific others, but to get 
 
 146  In one example of this “worst-case scenario,” the plaintiff filed suit in the 
Northern District of California and tried joining over 5,000 anonymous defendants, 
even though he conceded that “only [one] out of [seven] defendants were likely 
using a California IP address when the alleged infringing behavior occurred, and 
only [one] out of [five] of these California IP addresses were likely from the 
Northern District of California.”  On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1–5011, 280 F.R.D. 500, 
504 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  In another case, plaintiff conceded that approximately thirty 
percent of Doe defendants were likely misidentified (i.e., that the person associated 
with the IP address is not the one who committed the copyright infringement).  
Digital Sin, Inc. v. John Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 147  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 148  LaFond, supra note 37, at 55 (“An individual device cannot, however, connect 
to all peers in each swarm subset at the same time.  Each peer is allowed to share with 
only a fixed number (usually four) of other peers at a given time.”).  Thus, even if a 
BitTorrent user affirmatively chooses to enter a swarm, he does not then choose 
which particular members of the swarm with whom he will connect. 
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the file as quickly as possible from whoever may be in the swarm.149  
The swarm is essentially the overarching infrastructure that allows the 
swarm members to connect to one another.150  Therefore, evidence of 
entering a particular swarm should satisfy the “same transaction” or 
“occurrence” prong.  Additionally, because the question of whether 
the defendant committed copyright infringement will be a question 
of law “common to all defendants,” the second prong should be 
satisfied, since all that is required is that there be any common 
question of law or fact.  Therefore, proof that each defendant 
entered a particular swarm should satisfy both elements of Rule 
20(a)(2) for discovery purposes. 
Where judges can flex their discretionary muscle, however, is 
under Rule 20(b).  Rule 20(b) states that even if the Rule 20(a)(2) 
conditions are met, the court may order separate trials to protect 
against “embarrassment, delay, expense, or other prejudice . . . .”151  
Judge Baylson, presiding in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
neatly summarized the various reasons courts have given for denying 
joinder of Doe defendants in BitTorrent cases: 
(i) the likelihood that each John Doe defendant will assert 
different defenses, thereby adding factual and legal 
questions that are not common among all defendants, (ii) 
many John Doe defendants are proceeding pro se, and will 
therefore incur significant expense serving papers and 
attending depositions of all other parties to the lawsuit, (iii) 
the likelihood that many of the John Doe defendants are 
not the actual individuals who illegally downloaded the 
motion pictures in question, (iv) the likelihood that joinder 
will facilitate coercive settlements among the John Doe 
defendants; and (v) plaintiff’s avoidance of paying filing 
fees by pursuing mass actions.152 
These are generally practical reasons for denying joinder, all of which 
fall within the discretionary “embarrassment, delay, expense, or other 
 
 149  Cf. Brown, supra note 102. 
 150  Id. 
 151  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2).  Additionally, the court is permitted to sever 
improperly joined parties at any time, as long as the severance is on just terms and 
the entire action is not dismissed outright.  FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 152  Bellwether Trial Memo, supra note 71, at 15–16 (citations omitted).  As noted 
above, I believe that the first ground for severing defendants—”each John Doe 
defendant will assert different defenses, thereby adding factual and legal questions 
that are not common among all defendants”—is an incorrect reading of FED. R. CIV. 
P. 20(a)(2)(B), which only requires “any question of law or fact common to all 
defendants . . . .” (emphasis added).  Nevertheless, it is a valid reason for severing 
under Rule 20(b). 
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prejudice” bounds of Rule 20(b).  As a result, judges are increasingly 
growing wary of copyright trolls trying to use the federal courts as a 
one-stop-shop to gain names and addresses to thereafter send 
threatening settlement offers.153 
b.  Because Personal Jurisdiction Can Only Be Based on 
Domicile, Joinder Must be Similarly Limited 
At the very least, joinder should be limited to only those 
defendants who are domiciled in the judicial district in which the 
lawsuit is pending.  This requirement is in line with 28 U.S.C. § 
1400(a), the statute that governs venue for claims asserted under the 
Copyright Act, which states that “Civil actions, suits, or proceedings 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights . . . may be 
instituted in the district in which the defendant or his agent resides 
or may be found.”154  More fundamentally, limiting joinder in this 
manner comports with the co-principles of personal jurisdiction and 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”155  As 
mentioned in Part III.A.1.a supra, generally, in order for a court to 
have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must: 
consent to or waive personal jurisdiction;156 be physically present or 
domiciled in the jurisdiction;157 have certain minimum contacts with 
the jurisdiction;158 or have a reasonable expectation of facing suit in 
the jurisdiction.159  Personal jurisdiction—for purposes of joinder and 
discovery—in BitTorrent copyright cases can only be based off of 
presence or domicile within the jurisdiction. 
First, it is reasonable to assume that a Doe defendant would not 
consent to or waive personal jurisdiction in these circumstances.  
Second, “certain minimum contacts” and “reasonable expectation of 
 
 153  See IO Group, Inc. v. Does 1–435, No. 10-4382-SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14123, 
at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011) (“Plaintiff’s motive for seeking joinder, therefore, is to 
keep its own litigation costs down in hopes that defendants will accept a low initial 
settlement demand.  However, filing one mass action in order to identify hundreds 
of Doe defendants through pre-service discovery and facilitate mass settlement, is not 
what the joinder rules were established for.”); Order at 6, Malibu Media, LLC v. John 
Does 1–10, No. 2:12-cv-03623-RGK-SS (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012), ECF No. 7 (“The 
federal courts are not cogs in plaintiff’s copyright-enforcement business model.  The 
Court will not idly watch what is essentially an extortion scheme, for a case that 
plaintiff has no intention of bringing to trial.”). 
 154  28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2012). 
 155  Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). 
 156  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1). 
 157  Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463–64. 
 158  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 159  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
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facing suit in the jurisdiction” should not be deemed satisfied based 
solely on a defendant’s BitTorrent interaction with another 
defendant in a particular jurisdiction. A hypothetical best explains 
this point.  Assume, for example, that a plaintiff files a BitTorrent 
copyright suit in the District of New Jersey, alleging that he observed 
two defendants in a particular BitTorent swarm illegally downloading 
his client’s copyrighted film.  Based on the IP addresses, the plaintiff 
knows that Doe CA is located in California while Doe NJ is from New 
Jersey.160  The plaintiff argues that New Jersey has personal 
jurisdiction over Doe CA because Doe CA swapped bits of data with 
Doe NJ while in the swarm, such that Doe CA had minimum contacts 
with New Jersey or reasonably expected to face suit there. 
This minimum contacts argument is particularly belied by 
Hanson v. Denckla in which the Court held that in addition to 
minimum contacts, there must be “some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 
its laws.”161  Entering a BitTorrent swarm from a computer in 
California and then unintentionally being connected to a swarm 
member in New Jersey can hardly be characterized as personal 
availment to the extent that the California resident is “invoking the 
benefits and protections” of New Jersey laws.  It should not be 
presumed for discovery and joinder purposes that a defendant 
specifically directed BitTorrent activity to a particular jurisdiction, 
i.e., that Doe CA specifically directed his BitTorrent client to 
download the file only from other swarm members who are located in 
New Jersey.  Instead, the court should presume that a BitTorrent user 
does not care where the other members of the swarm are located, so 
long as he can download the file.  For these reasons, it also cannot be 
said that a BitTorrent user reasonably expects to face suit in all of the 
jurisdictions where the other members of the BitTorrent swarm are 
located.   
This is especially true when dealing with anonymous Doe 
defendants at the earliest stages of litigation because it is not certain 
that the person associated with the IP address—the person who is 
potentially being dragged into court hundreds of miles away—
committed the act at all.162  Indeed, as one judge pointed out, “it is no 
 
 160  See, e.g., Geolocation Service, INFOSNIPER, http://www.infosniper.net (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2013) (showing on a map where a particular IP address is located). 
 161  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 162  See Order & Report & Recommendation at 6–8, In re BitTorrent Adult Film 
Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 2:11-cv-03995-DRH-GRB (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012), 
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more likely that the subscriber to an IP address carried out a 
particular computer function . . . than to say an individual who pays 
the telephone bill made a specific phone call.”163  The risk of “false 
positives”—even when the subuscriber information is known—is very 
real and must not be downplayed.164 
c.  Joinder of Even Defandants Residing in the Judicial 
District can be Denied if the Judge Suspects the 
Plaintiff of Being a Copyright Troll 
Even if the ceiling of those who can be joined are those 
defendants residing in the judicial district in which the action is filed 
because of personal jurisdiction, judges can limit joinder even further 
via Rule 20(b).165  Thus, judges should use a “smell test” when ruling 
on such motions.  Part of this “smell test” should include looking to 
dockets across the country to see if the plaintiff or their counsel is a 
repeat filer, and if so, determining how many defendants have 
actually been served with a complaint for purposes of litigating the 
claim.  Additionally, if the plaintiff before the judge cannot formulate 
a bona fide discovery plan that will enable the lawsuit to proceed, the 
judge should err on the side of severance.  Under such 
circumstances, plaintiffs should be required to file individually 
against each defendant and not be allowed to skip out on the $350 
filing fee they would otherwise pay.  Judges must be wary of plaintiffs 
who do not have a good faith interest in using the federal courts as a 
forum to fairly litigate a dispute and who instead view the courts and 
the rules of civil procedure as devices to be manipulated in an 
extortive manner. 
B.  John Doe Defendants Should Remain Anonymous During Early 
Stages of Litigation 
As described in Part II, the most crucial element of copyright 
trolls’ settlement letter factory business model is finding out the true 
identities of the anonymous IP addresses, as this allows plaintiffs to 
 
ECF No. 39 (outlining reasons why an IP address alone is insufficient to identify the 
infringer). 
 163  Id. 
 164  Digital Sin, Inc. v. John Does 1–176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(plaintiff conceded that approximately thirty percent of Doe defendants were likely 
misidentified—i.e., the person associated with the IP address was not the one who 
committed the copyright infringement).  Furthermore, it is unclear how the plaintiff 
arrived at this number, and so the rate of misidentification could be even higher still. 
 165  See discussion in Part III.A.3.a supra. 
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send settlement offers.  Until the plaintiffs convince the court that 
they intend to actually litigate the claim of copyright infringement—
and are not simply fishing for names and addresses to send 
settlement offers—the court should keep the true identities of the 
alleged infringers hidden from the plaintiffs. 
Allowing a defendant to proceed anonymously in the court 
proceedings is substantively different from allowing a defendant to 
remain anonymous entirely.  Although the First Amendment protects 
anonymous speech,166 and its protections extend to the Internet,167 the 
First Amendment does not allow citizens to commit copyright 
infringement on the Internet simply by labeling the action 
“anonymous speech.”168 
Therefore, once the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of 
copyright infringement in the complaint, the court should allow for 
expedited discovery to uncover the true identities behind the IP 
addresses.  Importantly, however, under Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an 
order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .”169  Allowing Doe 
defendants to remain anonymous throughout the proceedings is 
proper even though the public has a “legitimate interest” in knowing 
the identities of parties involved in litigation in the federal courts.170  
Keeping the defendants’ identities anonymous for the initial stages of 
litigation will protect them from being harassed by overzealous 
copyright trolls merely hoping to extract quick settlement dollars.  
Although there is a “presumption of openness in judicial 
proceedings,”171 the court, in its discretion, can grant the “rare 
dispensation” of anonymity, so long as the court inquires into the 
circumstance of the particular case before doing so.172 
 
 166  See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found. Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199–200 
(1999). 
 167  See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 168  Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562–63 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“The First Amendment . . . does not protect copyright infringement, and the 
Supreme Court, accordingly, has rejected First Amendment challenges to copyright 
infringement actions.”) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 555–56 (1985)). 
 169  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 170  Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 171  Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[P]arties to a lawsuit must 
typically openly identify themselves in their pleadings . . . .”). 
 172  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting 
James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.1993)). 
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Balancing the public interest against fairness to the parties shows 
that anonymity is proper in BitTorrent copyright cases.  First, the 
public interest in learning whose IP address was used to allegedly 
download pornography illegally from the Internet is presumably low.  
Second, because at the early discovery stage it is far from clear that 
the person whose name is associated with the IP address is the person 
who actually committed the illegal download,173 it is reasonable to 
keep the IP account holder’s identity private, particularly when 
embarrassing content such as pornography is the basis of the lawsuit.  
Finally, the “smell test” is also of use here.  If the court has reason to 
believe that the plaintiff has no intention of actually litigating the 
copyright claim, it is reasonable to keep the identities anonymous in 
order to frustrate the “settlement letter factory” business model.  
Therefore, the court should err on the side of granting protective 
orders for all Doe defendants. 
To reiterate, allowing the defendant to remain anonymous for 
purposes of the early stages of litigation is not the same as allowing 
copyright infringement to go unpunished.174  That is why courts who 
decide to allow Doe defendants to remain anonymous should still 
grant subpoenas on the ISPs in order to obtain the true identities of 
the account holders.  Once identified, though, this information 
should be kept confidential and be known to the court only.  From 
there, the court can act as arbiter between the plaintiff and the 
anonymous defendant to make sure that the settlement offers are 
accurate and that undue harassment does not occur.  If the plaintiff 
shows a good faith interest in actually wanting to litigate the case, the 
court could, at its discretion, lift the protective order as the litigation 
progresses.  Thus, allowing defendants to remain anonymous while 
still subpoenaing the ISPs is an effective way to eliminate copyright 
trolling while still keeping proper avenues of relief open and 
available. 
 
 173  See supra notes 162–64 (outlining reasons why an IP address alone is 
insufficient to identify the infringer). 
 174  To be sure, I agree that Doe defendants have “no cognizable claim of privacy 
in their subscriber information.”  Order at 3, Achte/Neunte Boll Kino Beteiligungs 
GMBH & Co KG v. Adrienne Neal and Does 1–139, No. 1:10-cv-00453-RMC (D.D.C. 
Sept. 16, 2010), ECF No. 91 (holding that Does could not remain anonymous).  The 
crucial distinction that courts need to be aware of, however, is that there is a 
difference between claims of privacy in the subscriber information in and of itself, 
and that same subscriber information used in the context of “settlement letter 
factory” copyright trolls.  As is indicative of judicial response to copyright trolls in 
general, the trend is thankfully moving towards recognizing such a distinction.  See 
Bellwether Trial Memo, supra note 71, at 14. 
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C.  Awarding of Statutory Minimum 
The Copyright Act explicitly states that copyright infringers can 
be held liable for either: (1) the copyright holder’s actual damages 
and the infringer’s profits, or (2) statutory damages ranging from 
$750 to $30,000 per infringement, if actual damages are difficult to 
calculate.175  If a copyright holder requests statutory damages, the 
court can increase the maximum award to $150,000 if the court finds 
that “infringement was committed willfully . . . .”176  Although 
statutory damages thus have a very broad range of $750 to $150,000, 
it is within a judge’s discretion to decide how much to actually 
award.177 
The availability of statutory damages has undoubtedly enabled 
copyright trolls to flourish.178  For example, copyright trolls often 
make reference to the $150,000 per infringement upper limit when 
sending settlement offers to alleged infringers.179  This is undoubtedly 
included to frighten recipients into settling without putting up a 
fight.  As a result, there is a growing call for change regarding the 
availability of statutory damages.  For example, one commentator 
believes that the best way to eliminate copyright trolls is to eliminate 
statutory damages altogether.180  Another contends that statutory 
damages should be available only if some compensable harm can first 
be shown.181  While there is certainly merit to both of these 
 
 175  17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
 176  Id. at § 504(c)(2). 
 177  Determination of the amount of statutory damages should be “as the court 
considers just.”  Id. at § 504(c)(1); see also Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, 
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
439, 502 n.313 (2009) (noting that “there is nothing that prevents courts from 
refusing to award more than the statutory minimum without an offering of proof 
that an amount in excess of the minimum is justified” and that this approach is in 
line with the legislative history surrounding passage of the statutory damages 
provision). 
 178  Balganesh, supra note 38, at 13 (noting the “real inducement” for the 
existence of copyright trolls is statutory damages, “which render its business model 
not just viable, but also potentially lucrative”). 
 179  See Offer Letter, supra note 4. 
 180  James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright 
Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 108 (2012) 
(“Removal of statutory damages is the best remedy for both compensating copyright 
holders and protecting individuals from copyright troll suits . . . .”). 
 181  Balganesh, supra note 38, at 50.  Balganesh offers a solution that “introduces a 
heightened rule of standing for non-author plaintiffs,” in order to ensure that “the 
basis of their legal claims, in theory, tracks those of actual authors/creators, who 
copyright law is primarily designed to serve.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Ultimately, 
Balganesh’s solution “would make the availability of statutory damages for non-
author plaintiffs depend on their establishing the existence of some compensable 
MORTENSON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  2:06 PM 
2013] COMMENT 1133 
suggestions, both would require Congressional action and thus would 
take time to implement.182  In the meantime, the best course of action 
to curb copyright trolling is to award the statutory minimum, 
especially for default judgments.183  This course of action is even more 
effective if the judge also denies joinder, requiring a separate filing 
fee for each plaintiff.  This will help handicap copyright trolls until 
Congress chooses to act on altering statutory damages. 
D.  Remedies for Defendants to Encourage Them Not to Settle 
One of the most problematic elements of BitTorrent copyright 
litigation is that often the defendants simply do not have the money 
to fight the charges in court, even if they are factually innocent.  The 
court should make defendants aware of certain remedies184 which 
mitigate these concerns.  First and foremost, the Copyright Act 
specifically allows courts to award attorney’s fees.185  This in itself 
should encourage factually innocent defendants to come forward and 
fight false claims in court.  Additionally, defendants can file motions 
under Rule 54(d)186 in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1927187 for costs 
 
harm.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  The problem with this solution on its face, 
however, is that authors of the copyrighted works are increasingly filing as plaintiffs. 
 182  Reselling Media Content: Seconds to Go, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2013, at 71 
(“Congress could intervene and rejig the Copyright Act of 1976 . . . . But that would 
require Washington to get its act together—a plotline so implausible that it would 
make J.K. Rowling blush.”). 
 183  See, e.g., Order Granting Default Judgment, K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1–54, No. 
2:11-cv-01604-NVW (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2012), ECF No. 46; see also Samuelson & 
Wheatland, supra note 177, at 501 (advocating for the awarding of the statutory 
minimum when “the plaintiff lost no profits and the defendant made no profits from 
the infringement, or when damages and profits are nominal or minimal”) (citation 
omitted). 
 184  Although limited in scope, it is worth noting here that when the plaintiff filing 
a John Doe BitTorrent copyright action is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
be able to require that plaintiff post an undertaking.  Simply put, when an 
unlicensed foreign corporation files suit in United States court, they may be required 
to post a bond with the clerk of the court to ensure that defendant will recover its 
statutorily entitled costs if plaintiff loses.  See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Post 
Undertaking, AF Holdings, LLC v. David Trinh, No. 3:12-cv-02393-CRB (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 9, 2012), ECF No. 23. 
 185  17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its 
discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the 
United States or an officer thereof.  Except as otherwise provided by this title, the 
court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the 
costs.”). 
 186  See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) (“[C]osts . . . should be allowed to the prevailing 
party.”). 
 187  “Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 
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to help defray any expenses they incur. 
For particularly egregious conduct by copyright trolls, sanctions 
under Rule 11 may be appropriate188 along with filing a complaint to 
the state bar association.  Additionally, defendants who feel they have 
been unduly harassed could file a lawsuit against the plaintiff for 
abuse of process.189  Although underused, the tort of abuse of process 
is recognized by the United States Supreme Court, all fifty states, and 
the District of Columbia.190  The exact requirements vary from state to 
state, but generally the claim requires three elements: (1) wrongful 
use of process; (2) to achieve an ulterior purpose; (3) with damages 
resulting.191  As this Comment has shown by describing the common 
practices of copyright trolls, there is a strong argument for finding 
them liable under this standard. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Courts should be cognizant of copyright’s Constitutional goals of 
promoting the useful arts192 and creation of new works.193  Schemes 
designed to simply wring money from alleged defendants do not 
comport with these goals.  Furthermore, allowing copyright trolls to 
exist unchecked could fundamentally alter copyright protection by 
encouraging creation of works solely to generate settlements.  As the 
digital revolution continues to transform industry and society, it is 
imperative that copyright holders be allowed to protect their rights.  
 
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the 
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such 
conduct.”  28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 188  Sanctions under Rule 11 “may include nonmonetary directives; an order to 
pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective 
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable 
attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.”  FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11(c)(4). 
 189  “One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another 
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to 
the other for harm caused by the abuse of process.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 682 (1977). 
 190  Jeffrey J. Utermohle, Look What They’ve Done to My Tort, Ma: The Unfortunate 
Demise of “Abuse of Process” in Maryland, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002). 
 191  Id. at 8. 
 192  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Some question whether pornography “promotes 
the useful arts” and thus whether it can be copyrighted at all.  See Chris Matyszczyk, 
Copyright defendant: Porn may be, um, unprotected, CNET (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-57372240-71/copyright-defendant-porn-may-
be-um-unprotected. 
 193  Balganesh, supra note 9, at 1577 (“Copyright law is thus thought to exist 
primarily to give authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter 
disseminate their works publicly.”). 
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Pirating copyrighted material on the Internet is illegal and must not 
be allowed to flourish unchecked.  There is a fine line, however, 
between protecting rights and extortion.  In the end, courts should 
be respected as places where actual disputes are resolved; they should 
not be exploited as a mere tool in a “settlement letter factory” 
business. 
This Comment has argued that the most effective way to rein in 
copyright trolls is to use a “smell test” in conjunction with other 
safeguards.  In particular, judges in their discretion should limit 
joinder of anonymous Doe defendants, allow such defendants to 
remain anonymous throughout the early stages of litigation, and 
award only the statutory minimum of damages if a defendant 
defaults.  Additionally, remedies exist that should encourage 
defendants not to settle if they are wrongly targeted by a copyright 
troll.  Copyright trolls are a blight on the federal judiciary and judges 
should be proactive in restricting their abusive practices. 
